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Generalization in information systems re-
search is important because of the highly ap-
plied and vocational nature of the field. How-
ever, the concept is often inappropriately and
narrowly confined to one or two views of re-
search. This paper develops the concept of
generalizability as a two-stage process. The
first stage involves creating a general case
from a base case (or cases). The second stage
involves applying the general case to a goal
case. The predominant concern in the infor-
mation systems literature regards only stage
one generalization. This neglect of the stage
two generalization process leads to over-
sights in the nature of qualitative generaliza-
tion. These oversights include varying stand-
ards of criteria that apply to different classes
of generalization.
1. Introduction
The term “generalizability” refers to the
usefulness of a theoretical construct out-
side of its limited domain of known ob-
servations. The term refers to a concept
that is laden with conflict for researchers
in information systems (IS). In one
sense, “strict generalizability” is used in
statistic-based studies to indicate the
probable mathematical relationships be-
tween observations of phenomena in a
sample and the phenomena in the corre-
sponding population. The term is also
used in a broader sense as a reference to
the “general case”. The general case is an
abstract conceptual phenomenon that
shares certain defined characteristics
with a bounded set of observed phenom-
ena. The broad and strict sense of the
term differ only in the importance of sta-
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tistical sampling for delineating the gen-
eral case.
For IS research, the broad sense of
generalizability is a key criterion for suc-
cess. This is because the general case for
any theory is closely related to relevance
and practicability. Relevance regards the
usefulness of research to its audience,
which may include other researchers or
other practitioners. This relevance is an
important criterion for assessing IS re-
search (Keen 1991). “Practicability” is
the ability to place the theory into prac-
tice. This ability regards the practical
usefulness of research findings in either
day-to-day or strategic decision making
by IS professionals. Research becomes
generalizable because its usefulness is
apparent (it is relevant), and the mechan-
ics of using it are apparent (it is practica-
ble). This link between generalizability,
through relevance and practicability, is
particularly important to IS research be-
cause the IS research field is highly ap-
plied, almost vocational in nature (Ban-
ville and Landrey 1989):
Science aims at general understanding
rather than at the explanation of individ-
ual events. . . . The utility of a social the-
ory or social correlation is enhanced by
its generalizability. The larger the scope
of phenomena it explains, the more use-
ful it is. (Babbie 1990, p. 13, 25)
Because IS is an applied, vocational re-
search field, generalizability is a crucial
aspect in assessing the impact of most IS
research findings. Practitioners can ad-
just their decisions with regard to this
general case (cf. Cooper 1988). Follow-
on researchers can relate their discover-
ies to this general case.
Information systems practitioners
generalize their experience intuitively.
Like good consultants, they map their
practical experiences onto any new set-
tings in their search for solutions to their
immediate problems. This map consti-
tutes the characteristics selectively ab-
stracted from previous experiments and
is analogous to our concept of the “gen-
eral case”. This is a highly applied form
of generalization.
Are all forms of research generaliza-
ble? For example, if one conducts a sin-
gle experiment or an in-depth study of a
single organizational experience, can
this experience be generalized to new or-
ganizational settings? Practitioners are
often forced to apply their experience in
this way because a singular similar expe-
rience is all they have to drawn upon in
some problem settings. Yet academic re-
searchers seem to operate with more lim-
ited acceptance of generalizability:
In other words, generalizability is a qual-
ity describing a theory that has been
tested and confirmed in a variety of situ-
ations, whether such testing is conducted
through case research, laboratory experi-
ments, statistical experiments or natural
experiments. (Lee 1989)
This limited acceptance seems to suggest
that a valid mapping of previous experi-
ence onto new settings is only permissi-
ble when the previous experience repre-
sents a “variety of situations”. This rules
out the potential value of a “unique” ex-
perience, for example, when a particular
problem setting has only occurred once
before, as in case studies (cf. Benbasat et
al. 1987). It also suggests that the find-
ings of research approaches that focus on
unique settings (e.g., ethnographies, ac-
tion research and interpretive case stud-
ies) cannot be applied to new problem
settings. Yet practitioners seem to value
case study research highly, and case
studies are a popular pedagogical tool for
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improving the practical grounding of
business courses. 
Clearly there is something faulty in
our understanding of how our informa-
tion systems research is generalized. The
purpose of this paper is to explore the
philosophical foundation for different
forms of generalization in its broad
sense. We will free the concept from its
undue and improper binding to natural
science research models, and explore the
forms of generalization as they exist in
other popular IS research models. To a
large extent, this paper addresses a do-
main that is much broader than IS, and
applies to the field of social enquiry as a
whole. However, the vocational nature
of IS makes it quite natural that this crit-
ical philosophical groundwork should
emerge from the IS arena.
To accomplish this purpose, we will
first consider the social science assump-
tions that confuse this issue. Following
this discussion, in section three, we will
discuss the characteristics of the general-
ization process. In section four, we will
describe the four classes of generaliza-
tion based on these characteristics. This
will enable us to consider the various cri-
teria for generalization in each of these
classes (section five). The nature of these
criteria are important for IS research be-
cause different research modes imply
different standards by which the research
can be measured with regard to these cri-
teria. The paper will conclude with a dis-
cussion of the traditions and implications
of such criteria and our four-class view
of generalization.
2. Characteristics of Research 
Enquiries
In the natural sciences, the strongest gen-
eralizations are theoretical propositions
that entail causal laws-of-nature. Such
causal laws are impossible for the social
sciences. The social sciences must de-
pend on less powerful explanations, such
as probabilistic, genetic and teleological
explanations:
To be sure, the laws or generalizations
concerning social phenomena made
available by current social inquiry are far
more restricted in scope of application,
are formulated far less precisely, and are
acceptable as factually sound only if
understood to be hedged in by a far
larger number of tacit qualifications and
exceptions, than are most of the com-
monly cited laws of the physical sci-
ences. In this respect, however, the
generalizations of social inquiry do not
appear to differ radically from generali-
zations currently advanced in domains
usually regarded as unquestionably
respectable subdivisions of natural sci-
ence C for example, in the study of tur-
bulence phenomena and in embryology.
(Nagel 1969, p. 449).
That is, “less powerful” generalization
should not imply “inoperative” generali-
zation. It is a fallacy to confine causality,
explanation or generalization to a closely
bounded set of scientific assumptions.
The concepts apply quite broadly, and IS
researchers should not dismiss these cri-
teria out-of-hand. The appendix explores
a number of fundamentally contrasting
views of scientific enquiry, all of which,
on both sides of their dichotomies, admit
generalization.
The fundamentally problematic di-
chotomy lies between nomothetic gener-
alization and idiographic generalization.
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Nomothetic science involves the search
for general laws of nature which hold
with a necessity (cannot be broken) and
permit no genuine exceptions. In con-
trast, idiographic science involves the
study of particular cases. An idiographic
theory is developed for one case; a
nomothetic theory is developed for an
entire class of cases. Clearly law-like
nomothetic statements entail generaliza-
tion. Nomothetic “science” like chemis-
try and physics is sometimes contrasted
with idiographic “enquiry” such as histo-
ry and geography. Idiographic social
“science”, entailed in the action re-
search, the case studies and the ethnogra-
phies popular among IS researchers, is
primarily questioned as science because
these modes of enquiry do not emit law-
like statements.
Much of the work below is concerned
with explicating the manifestation and
nature of this idiographic generalizabili-
ty. However, before proceeding to this
discussion, it may be useful to examine
the nomothetic dismissal of idiographic
social science, and the corresponding
resignation of the modern scientific
claim by some social inquirers.
Most idiographic methods of enquiry
also tend to fail some of the criteria of the
“normal” or “received” dichotomous po-
sitions described in the appendix, such as
objectivism and reductionism. However,
it is the lack of nomothetical findings
that most strongly denies the scientific
nature of idiographic enquiry:
Much of the ‘social theory’ that has
emerged from [the study of human soci-
ety], in the past as well as the present, is
social and moral philosophy rather than
social science. . . . In consequence, the
property of designating any extant
branch of social inquiry as a ‘real sci-
ence’ has been repeatedly challenged C
commonly on the ground that, although
such inquiries have contributed large
quantities of frequently reliable informa-
tion about social matters, these contribu-
tions are primarily descriptive studies of
special social facts in certain historically
situated human groups, and supply no
strictly universal laws about social phe-
nomena. (Nagel 1969, p. 447-449).
Among social scientists, there is a certain
amount of fratricide over the issue of
nomothetic generalization. Advocates of
specific forms of social enquiry dismiss
the scientific nature of other forms be-
cause these other forms lack law-like
generalizability:
Although case studies are conducted in
such a way as to provide detailed infor-
mation about social units, they are often
criticized as being limited in scope and
not sufficient for meaningful generaliza-
tions to be made to larger social aggre-
gates. Again we encounter the problem
of the representativeness of the case.
(Black and Champion 1976, p. 92).
This fratricidal rhetoric can sometimes
lead to narrow, chauvinistic statements
that broadly dismiss much of the body of
social enquiry from any claim to the stat-
ure of “science”:
The term ‘truth’ is red meat for philoso-
phers and they are welcome to it. Science
prefers to operate in the less lofty region
of falsifiable statements that can be
tested by evidence, and verifiable obser-
vations that can be checked by someone
else. (Hoover 1976, p.40)
Some social researchers have chosen to
leave the generalizability debate by exit-
ing from their claims to any scientific
stature for their social enquiries. At the
extreme position of this idiographic en-
quiry viewpoint, this equally strident
4
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contingent is prepared to (rather thank-
fully) leave behind the “grand narrative”
of science. This postmodern view of
non-scientific social enquiry as a pre-
ferred position over the shackles of mod-
ern science is itself varied. The two ex-
treme postmodern positions are known
as the “affirmatives” and the “skeptics”
(Rosenau 1992). These two extreme po-
sitions differ in their viewpoints on gen-
eralization. The affirmatives still hold
causality, explanation and generalization
in limited value. This value is limited by
the multiplicity of truth and local narra-
tives. The skeptics acknowledge com-
plete relativism and no longer regard
constructs like generalization as useful.
We will discuss generalization in
terms that apply to a broad view of social
enquiry. These terms will regard the val-
ue of generalization to social enquiry as
part of the grand narrative of science.
These terms will also stretch to regard
the value of generalization for local nar-
ratives and multiple readings of the text
of the enquiry. That is, these terms are
relevant to affirmative postmodern sci-
ence. Our scope reaches its limit at this
boundary. This discussion will have only
limited use in the sense of skeptical post-
modernism.
3. Characteristics of Generalization
Typically, we distinguish between two
types of “cases” in the generalization
process. A base case is the setting, or
groups of settings that were the basis for
the research. For example, if a case study
is made in the wire room of Brinks Bank,
the wire room of Brinks Bank at that
time is the base case. If a survey is taken
of 100 Indian IS managers, the 100 Indi-
an IS managers at that time represent the
100 base cases. A general case is an ab-
stract, theoretical case that manifests a
relevant subset of the characteristics of
the base case (or shared characteristics of
the base cases). For example, we might
construct a general case as an imaginary
“typical” Indian IS manager based on
our survey, or an imaginary “typical”
wire room based on our Brinks case
study.
This two-case view of generalization
disregards idiographic research because
it is incomplete. The complete process
involves a third case. This third case, the
goal case, is the application of the gener-
al case in some new setting. The goal
case is the application setting for the re-
search findings. For example, we create
a goal case if we predict the behavior of
the IS manager of a New Delhi water
pump distributor based on the general
case in our survey. Likewise, if we rede-
sign the Barclays Bank wire room based
on the general case discovered in the
study of the Brinks wire room, the Bar-
clays wire room is the goal case. The
generalization process implies the crea-
tion of at least one chain of all three types
of cases, not just the first two types.
Because the chain involves three
types of case, the generalization process
takes place in two (possibly iterative)
stages. Stage One Generalization in-
volves the creation of the general case
out of the base case (or cases). See 1.
This process could be deductive or in-
ductive. In a deductive model, the gener-
al case constructed before the base case
is observed (along with the theory), and
the base case observations are confirma-
tory. In an inductive model, the base case
is analyzed for relevant characteristics,
perhaps discovered as shared character-
5
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istics among several base cases. The gen-
eral case is created from this analysis.
Stage Two Generalization involves esti-
mating the behavior of the goal case (or
cases) given the general case, and will
sometimes involve sharing the general
case concepts between the original re-
searchers and other reseachers or practi-
tioners. Even if the original researchers
are also estimating the behavior of the
goal case, this will sometimes involve a
lapse of time and their own shifts in
viewpoint. See 1. In a practical sense,
stage two generalization completes the
mapping process of the practitioner from
experience onto new problem settings.
The general case is embodied in the char-
acteristic-bearing map. The emphasis is
on the goal case, and the general case is
often framed in the context of this goal
case. This is opposite for the original re-
searcher. Researchers usually frame the
general case in the context of the base
case.
This generalization process may be
iterative in that, for stage two generaliza-
tion to be “successful”, the goal case
must consistently share the characteris-
tics predicated on the general case. This
success effectively converts the goal
case into a base case, and reinforces be-
liefs in the generalized characteristics of
the general case. However, successful
stage two generalization may suggest re-
finements or adjustments to the general
case because of slight differences be-
tween the experiences of the goal case
and the expected experiences based on
the general case. This precipitates a new
round of stage one generalization, as the
general case is modified based on the
newly expanded set of base cases. This
full generalization process is similar in
nature to the double-loop model of or-
ganizational learning (Argyris and
Schön 1978). This two-stage process
does not mean that generalizable re-
search requires multiple studies in order
to achieve generalization, any more than
the creation of theory requires theory ev-
olution (i.e., theory-building studies fol-
lowed by theory-testing studies). Al-
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though an evolving theory implies an
evolving general case, a general case is
implied by any newly created and untest-
ed theory. Stage two generalization does
not require a follow-up study (but would
certainly be a component in the concep-
tion of a follow-up study). A full gener-
alization does require that the general
case becomes useful. A generalization is
an empirical implication of theorizing
about base cases (stage one), and an in-
spiration in theorizing about goal cases
(stage two). The general case is negotiat-
ed between the two “theorizers”.
There is a close relationship between
the underlying theory and the general
case. From certain viewpoints, the gen-
eral case is the theory, to the extent that
theory is comprised by covering laws
that describe ordinary linear reality
(DiMaggio 1995). For example, a typical
goal in systems science is an abstract
systemic model of related phenomena.
This abstract model can be defined as the
general case. Sutton and Staw (1995) ar-
gue that such a covering-law viewpoint
is too weak to constitute theory because
these provide no supporting narrative
that explain exactly why the general case
appears (cf. Weick 1995). A weak theory
setting may conflate the general case and
theory. In a strong theory setting, the
general case becomes the central empiri-
cal implication or projection inferred
from the theory.
A strictly orthodox view of generali-
zation leaves these empirical projects
hanging in space, potentially unwanted
and pragmatically useless. This view
holds that stage one generalization is the
complete process. Such a narrow view
would be inconsistent with the relevance
criterion important to a vocational field
such as information systems. In the IS
field, generalization must entail the sec-
ond stage, projecting the general case
(e.g., a systemic model) onto goal cases.
There are two dichotomies that char-
acterize a broad view of generalization.
The two dichotomies involve the con-
trasting positions regarding the basis for
discovering the general case and the goal
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case: universal or idiographic settings. In
a universal setting, the general case is re-
lated to a universe of base or goal cases
(or both). In an idiographic setting, the
general case is related only to one partic-
ular base or goal case.1
3.1. Universal and Idiographic Stage 
One Generalization
The difference between universal and id-
iographic stage one generalization re-
gards the cardinality between the general
case and the base case population. A
one-to-one relationship between the base
case and the general case (i.e. a single
base case is abstracted to form the gener-
al case) is an idiographic stage one gen-
eralization. A one-to-many relationship
between the general case and the base
cases is a universal stage one generaliza-
tion.
Universal stage one generalizations
are made on the foundations of multiple
observations of phenomena. To some de-
gree the general case represents a uniting
or merging of the shared, common char-
acteristics of all of the base cases.
Idiographic stage one generalizations
may represent an abstraction of certain
characteristics of the single base case
and the positing of these as the general
case. On the other hand, idiographic
stage one generalization may suggest
that the base is itself a general case. That
is, there may not only be a one-to-one re-
lationship between the base case and the
general case, the two cases may be
viewed as exactly the same (as in the sys-
tems science modelling example men-
tioned in section two).
3.2. Universal and Idiographic Stage 
Two Generalization
The difference between idiographic and
universal stage two generalization re-
gards the cardinality between the general
case and the goal case population. A one-
to-one relationship between the base
case and goal case (i.e., the general case
is transformed to suit a single goal case)
is an idiographic stage two generaliza-
tion. A one-to-many relationship be-
tween the general case and the goal cases
is a universal stage two generalization. 
Universal stage two generalizations
are made on the assumption that the gen-
eral case will apply to some bounded
universe of multiple goal cases. The im-
portant element here is the presence of
some predefinition of the set of goal cas-
es to which the general case can be ap-
plied. A key element in universal stage
two generalization is the description,
specification or delineation of the char-
acteristics of the set of the goal cases.
Usually the goal cases will share all of
the characteristics defined by the general
case, and very little interpretation is nec-
essary by the receiver of the research
findings. In statistical surveys, for exam-
ple, this element would regard the delin-
eation of the population for which the
sample is purported to represent.
Idiographic stage two generalizations
imply that the second stage of the gener-
alization process is unique to the goal
case. In published research studies, such
idiographic generalization depends on
the reader to interpret the characteristics
of the general case in the context of the
goal case. This is a much more practi-
tioner-oriented mode of generalization.
The researcher to defers the definition of
the goal case to the reader. The important
element here is the lack of any predefini-
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tion of the set of goal cases to which the
general case can be applied. The re-
searcher will bring out the characteristics
of the general case, but not all of these
characteristics will apply to any particu-
lar goal case. The receiver of the re-
search will have to interpret the general
case for each particular goal case. Such
research findings do not deny intrinsical-
ly that stage two generalization can take
place, but this stage is deferred to the re-
ceiver of the research findings. 
Idiographic stage two generalization
is postmodern in the sense that the “read-
er” is drawn into the hermeneutic inter-
pretation of the general case. Idiographic
stage two generalization implies that the
“meaning” of the general case is deferred
to the audience of the research. The re-
search defines the base case (or cases)
and the general case, but does not define
the goal case (thus completing the stage
one generalization but not the stage two
generalization). The reader contributes
the stage two generalization and estab-
lishes the goal case. We will use the term
“deferred generalizability” to refer to
this postponement of the definition of a
goal case. Idiographic stage two general-
izations imply deferred generalizability.
4. Four Classes of Generalization
These two dichotomies of idiographic
and universal concepts applied in the two
stages of generalization can be used to
define a four class model of generaliza-
tion. This model is shown in Table 3. The
horizontal axis of this table is divided
into universal and idiographic stage one
generalization. The vertical axis of this
table is divided into universal and idio-
graphic stage two generalization. These
axes form a four-quadrant classification
system for generalization. Each quadrant
is named in terms of its stage two gener-
alizability, implying the practical rele-
vance and the critical importance of the
second stage in the generalization proc-
ess. Each of these classes is discussed
briefly below.
4.1. Nomothetic Universal (NU) 
Generalization
NU generalization is based on universal
stage one generalization and universal
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a many-to-many
correspondence between the base cases
and the goal cases. Social enquiry re-
search that makes such generalizations






Universal Nomothetic Universal (NU)base *C general C+ goal
Provisional Universal (PU)
base CC general C+ goal
Idiographic Deductive Idiographic (DI)base *C general CC goal
Inductive Idiographic (II)
base CC general CC goal
“CC” symbolizes one-to-one cardinality, “C+” symbolizes one-to-many cardinality.
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depends on law-like statements that have
carefully defined base cases and goal
cases. These statements are typically
very formal, quantitative and probabilis-
tic. The primary methods in information
systems that lead to these generalizations
are surveys (Baroudi and Orlikowski
1989) and laboratory experiments (Jar-
venpaa et al. 1985) that claim represent-
ative samples in a defined population.
The mode of NU generalizations is
the probable determinism in statements
about the goal cases. Error rates are pre-
determined in the sense that the research
can define its mathematical accuracy in
determining the goal cases. These gener-
alizations are typified by questionnaire
surveys in which a substantial number of
base cases are projected on a population
of goal cases. One example of such stud-
ies in IS is published by Igbaria and Ba-
roudi (1995), who surveyed 127 IS de-
velopment professionals to determine if
women received lower average job per-
formance ratings than men. Their find-
ings are generalized to all women and
men in the IS field (the goal cases), pos-
iting the general case the “women expe-
rience more restricted career advance-
ment than men” (p. 117).
4.2. Provisional Universal (PU) 
Generalization
PU generalization is based on idiograph-
ic stage one generalization and universal
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a one-to-many cor-
respondence between a single base case
and a population of goal cases. Social en-
quiry research that makes such generali-
zations will depend on a single base case
which is carefully selected on the basis
of its representative characteristics.
Methods that can lead to such generali-
zations include field experiments, natu-
ral experiments and case studies. For ex-
ample, one natural experiment compared
civilian moral in a heavily-bombed city
with an unbombed city to determine the
effect of blanket civilian bombing in
warfare. The result (no effective differ-
ence) is generalized in a PU sense to the
universal population of all civilian popu-
lations in all cities.
The mode of PU generalizations is
the provisional nature in statements
about the goal cases. Error rates in defin-
ing the goal cases and the defining char-
acteristics of the goal cases are virtually
unknown. The generalization is highly
provisional and tentative, posited almost
“temporarily” until further research
more clearly sets the bounds on the pop-
ulation of goal cases. One example of IS
research that adopts such a mode of gen-
eralization is the widely-cited case study
published by Orlikowski (1992) in
which she studied the organizational is-
sues raised by a Lotus Notes implemen-
tation. The findings are generalized to all
organizations whose groupware premis-
es are incongruent with the culture and
structure (p. 368, the goal cases). Al-
though characterized as exploratory, it is
posited that these elements have signifi-
cant effects on the early use of the tech-
nology (the general case, p. 367).
4.3. Deductive Idiographic (DI) 
Generalization
DI generalization is based on universal
stage one generalization and idiographic
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a many-to-one cor-
respondence between multiple base cas-
es and a single goal case. Social enquiry
research that makes such generalizations
will depend on multiple base cases that
10
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are selected opportunistically rather than
on any basis of representative character-
istics. These studies will avoid delinea-
tions or characterizations of the popula-
tion of goal cases. Methods that can typ-
ically lead to such generalizations in-
clude multiple case studies (that lack
selective criteria), comparative ethnog-
raphies, and grounded theory. For exam-
ple, grounded theory uses “theoretical
sampling” to guide the selection of ob-
servations as the research emerges. Mul-
tiple base cases are selected purely on the
basis of internal consistency in the gen-
eral case, with no real regard for any re-
lationship between the goal cases and ei-
ther the base and general cases.
The mode of DI generalizations is the
importance of the correspondence be-
tween the general case and the base cas-
es. No claims are made about the useful-
ness of the general case for goal cases.
DI generalizations entail deferred gener-
alizability. However, the mode of DI
generalizations is theoretical validity,
and suggest that the theory can be adapt-
ed (rather than directly applied) in goal
cases. That is, DI generalizations expect
that the general case must be interpreted
(modified) before it can be useful for any
goal case. Consequently, at the deferred
point of any stage two DI generalization,
the general case has to be corrected or
changed, thus creating a one-to-one cor-
respondence between the general case
and the goal case. Each usable general
case must be deduced from two premis-
es. The first premise is the posited gener-
al case in the research. The second
premise is the particular, unique situation
of the goal case.
An example of research assuming
this mode of generalization was pub-
lished by Applegate (1994). This work
reports a longitudinal, multiple case
study research design involving three
cases (base cases) and describing in
some detail the patterns of change within
the three firms (general case). This pat-
tern included the initiation of structural
change, followed by destabilization and
confrontation, followed by evolutionary
role changes and information systems
changes. However, Applegate defers the
goal case to the reader, allowing the de-
tails to “inform” future decisions.
4.4. Inductive Idiographic 
Generalization
II generalization is based on idiographic
stage one generalization and idiographic
stage two generalization. The general
case actually defines a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the base case and a
single goal case. Social enquiry research
that leads to such generalizations will de-
pend on a single in-depth base case that
is selected opportunistically rather than
on any basis of representative character-
istics. Like DI generalization, these stud-
ies will avoid delineations or characteri-
zations of the population of goal cases.
Methods that can typically lead to such
generalizations include immersive cul-
tural ethnographies, action research and
case studies based on participant obser-
vation. For example, action research
evolves its theory through a cycle of or-
ganizational stimulation, observation
and evaluation. The theory is highly lo-
calized to the unique organizational set-
ting, but implies that the knowledge (the
final theory) might form the basis for
commencing further action research in
other organizations. In action research,
the emerging theory suggests, but does
not prescribe the general case.
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The mode of II generalizations is the
indistinct nature of the general case. That
is, the mode of II generalizations in-
volves a dependence on holistic consist-
ency between the base case and an
emerging theory. The general case is
largely ignored. II generalization must
be devised almost entirely from the base
case to the goal case. Sometimes the gen-
eral case is only an implication of the
way that the goal case is being treated
under the light of the base case learning.
That is, at the deferred point of any II
generalization, the general case has to be
holistically created from the base case.
This means that both stages of generali-
zation are deferred. It also means that
there is a strong one-to-one correspond-
ence between the general case and the
goal case. This correspondence may be
so strong that the two cases are effective-
ly the same.
An example of IS research in this
mode is published in Berg et al. (1995).
This is a single case study using partici-
pant observation that explored the expe-
riences of IBM in developing an object-
oriented architecture for one of its prod-
ucts (the base case). The general case is
drawn in terms of “management lessons”
(like organizational structure) and “tech-
nical lessons” (like code bloating). The
goal case is only discussed in terms of
“relevance” to other projects (p. 56), and
this is entirely couched in terms of the
base case characteristics (like developer
and manager experience). It is left entire-
ly to the reader to distinguish between
the base case and the goal case, and de-
termine the relevance of the general case
characteristics to the goal case.
4.5. Four Generalization Classes
The four classes of generalization thus
correspond to the Cartesian product of
two parallel types of two stages of gener-
alization. Universal stage one generali-
zation typically means that the research-
ers are basing their model on the shared
characteristics of their study subjects, for
example, they may be counting fleas on
dogs. Idiographic stage one generaliza-
tion means that the researchers are bas-
ing their model on one particular subject.
For example, the relationship between a
dog named rover and its fleas (or be-
tween a particular flea and its dogs). Uni-
versal stage two generalization means
that the researchers are populating their
model with unexamined subjects, for ex-
ample, suggesting that all dogs have
fleas, or a certain number of fleas, or
have a particular relationship with its
fleas. Idiographic stage two generaliza-
tion means that the researcher’s model
must be specialized for each unexamined
subject, for example, suggesting that a
cow named bossy will have a relation-
ship with its parasites in some ways sim-
ilar, but in other ways different, to that of
dog rover and its fleas.
5. Criteria for Generalizability
The acceptance of generalizability in al-
ternative forms of social enquiry does
not imply that researchers become un-
bounded in their generalizations. The re-
search audience must have a means for
evaluating the effectiveness of any gen-
eral case posited by researchers. Such
evaluation can be demonstrated by re-
viewing the traditional mainstream crite-
ria for generalizability of knowledge in
terms of the four classes of generaliza-
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tion. These criteria are reliability and va-
lidity (Kirk & Miller 1986). We will
center our discussion on these two ra-
tional sets of criteria because these dom-
inate the objective view of science and
social enquiry.2 These criteria are often
narrowly defined for the domain of NU
generalizability, as in Straub (1989), that
describes a model for validating experi-
mental and survey IS research instru-
ments according to their internal validity
and reliability. In this section we will
demonstrate the extension of these crite-
ria that broadly applies to all four classes
of generalization.
5.1. Reliability
Reliability regards the extent to which
observations by multiple researchers
studying the same phenomenon with
similar purposes will yield approximate-
ly the same results (Gummesson 1988).
The concept of reliability is closely relat-
ed to universality, repeatability, and con-
sequently falsifiability. Reliability is a
characteristic that can be attached to ob-
servations of goal cases as well as base
cases. Consequently, reliability is a fac-
tor in both generalization stages, al-
though each stage may invoke different
types of reliability. There are three types
of reliability: quixotic, diachronic and
synchronic (Kirk and Miller 1986).
Quixotic reliability is the extent to
which a particular method of observation
yields an unvarying measurement. For
example, a broken thermometer is highly
reliable: it always reads the same. A
more qualitative example might be an or-
ganization’s policy-defined response
(immediately lowering prices to match
competition) which is always the same.
In a practical sense, deferred general-
izability could be wrongly accused of
quixotic reliability on the basis of the re-
search findings, because generalization
is not completed. However, this entails a
narrow view that the generalization
process actually excludes the second
stage, and the argument becomes recur-
sively applicable to all forms of general-
ization. It could also be argued that al-
most any base or general case could
prove of some value in an organization
facing a crisis, and that any tool of dis-
covery and analysis might prove equally
valuable. However, this argument also
applies to all forms of generalization,
whether deferred or not. The degree to
which generalizations might embody
quixotic reliability is a criterion that ap-
plies equally to all classes of generaliza-
tion.
Synchronic reliability is the extent to
which observations within the same time
frame are similar. For example, two or
more observers using the same method
of observation of the same phenomenon
would record the same result. This type
of reliability is especially interesting
when it fails because researchers must
discover how multiple, somehow differ-
ent measures might be simultaneously
true.
Synchronic reliability regards mostly
the stage one generalization process,
since it involves the agreement of several
measures on the strength of the relation-
ship between the base case and the gen-
eral case. Because each generalization
class handles stage one generalization
somewhat differently, this criterion does
not equally apply to all classes. For ex-
ample, multiple chains of evidence could
be used in case studies or experiments to
link the base case or base cases to the
general case. This suggests that this cri-
terion would be strongest in, and could
13
Baskerville: Deferring Generalizability: Four Classes of Generalization in Soc
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 1996
R. Baskerville 18
be equally applied to, the PU and DI
classes. Synchronic reliability is a practi-
cal problem in the NU class because
there are typically observations of a large
number of base cases required by the
probability statistics to underwrite the
nomothetic generalization. Synchronic
reliability is also a problem in stage II
generalizations because the stage one
generalization is deferred, and the au-
thors of the enquiry do not draw out the
general case at the time of the study.
Consequently, NU and II classes must be
held to a lower standard of synchronic
reliability than PU and DI classes.
Diachronic reliability is the extent to
which a particular method of observation
yields the same measurement when ex-
posed to a particular phenomenon at dif-
ferent points in time. This regards stabil-
ity of an observation through time (simi-
larity of measurements or findings taken
at different times). This is the typical
quantitative sense of the term reliability.
It implies that an instrument given to the
same population with no intervening
variables will yield the same results (i.e.,
a test-retest correlation coefficient).
Diachronic reliability regards only
the stage two generalization process in
the sense that the interpretation of the
goal case must occur under the light of
the general case. Consequently, univer-
sal stage two generalizations should
have strengths under this criterion owing
to the large population of goal cases. For
example, hypothetico-deductive re-
search methods provide formal evidence
of reliable stage two generalization.
However, even this diachronic reliability
is couched in probability arithmetic, and
any stage two generalization is some-
what tentative. On the other hand, dia-
chronic reliability is even more tentative
in idiographic stage two generalizations
where diachronic reliability is deferred
along with generalizability. Regarding
application of this criterion, NU and PU
forms of generalization can be expected
to have less tentative diachronic reliabil-
ity (i.e. held to a higher standard) than DI
or II forms of generalization.
5.2. Validity
Validity regards the extent to which an
observation measures what it purports to
measure. Validity means that a theory,
model, or concept accurately describes
reality. Validity is closely related to gen-
eralization because it deals with the se-
mantics of the theory. The close relation-
ship between the semantics of the theory
and the semantics of the general case to
both base case and goal case implies that
validity regards both stage one and stage
two generalization.
The concept of validity is easily con-
flated with the concept of representative-
ness in survey samples, experimental
subjects and objective case studies. Rep-
resentativeness is usually couched in
terms of the characteristic similarity of
the base cases to the goal cases. Howev-
er, this overlooks the intermediary role
of the general case in the process of two-
stage generalization. The defined effect
is that the general case should be repre-
sentative of both the base case(s) and the
goal case(s).
Validity can be analyzed using differ-
ent taxonomies. One taxonomy deals
typically with the semantics of the obser-
vational data. There are three types of
validity with regard to the semantics of
the data: criterion validity, content valid-
ity and construct validity (Babbie 1983,
Carmines and Zeller 1979). Another tax-
onomy deals with the causal inferences
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and correlations of the elements of the
theory. This second taxonomy is most
commonly considered in the negative
sense of the failures in the social enquiry:
internal and external invalidity (e.g.,
Campbell and Stanley 1963, Cook and
Campbell 1979).
From our perspective on generaliza-
tion, these taxonomies overlap because
the semantics of the data and the integri-
ty of the causal inferences are all part of
the process of creating and applying the
general case. To maintain consistency in
our discussion, we will consider the sec-
ond taxonomy in its positive inverse, and
relate this to the first taxonomy. The two
types of validity that are concerned with
the causal inferences of theory are inter-
nal and external validity. 
Internal validity is the extent to
which the causal analysis and explana-
tions offered by the theory reflect the re-
ality at the moment of the observations.
Internal validity regards the degree to
which the general case is representative
of the base case(s). Internal validity is of-
ten established by exhaustive rejection
of competing or alternative theories and
hypotheses. Internal validity is primarily
a criterion for stage one generalization:
the correspondence of the base case(s)
and the general case. Internal validity en-
tails both content and construct validity.
Content validity is the extent to
which the data from the base case(s) re-
flect the domain that is intended to be
measured. This regards the fit between
the observations of the social enquiry
and the reality in the base case. Content
validity is also called “apparent” or
“face” validity. For example, a maths
skills test that only covers addition
would lack content validity because sub-
traction, multiplication & division are ig-
nored. Stage one generalization that
lacks strong content validity would yield
an incomplete and inaccurate general
case. This implies that stage two general-
ization would eventually fail.
Construct validity is the extent to
which the data from the base case(s) is
related to the theory-under-test. This is
also known as “theoretical validity”, and
“instrumental validity.” Instrumental va-
lidity also suggests an indirect observa-
tion (an alternative phenomenon) is used
to predict the core phenomenon under
study. Construct validity is critically im-
portant when criterion or content validity
cannot be established (often meaning in-
direct measurement or instruments must
be used). For example, a researcher
might measure participation in school-
related activities as an indication of high
levels of self-esteem. Construct validity
also underpins the creation of a correct
general case. If the social enquiry lacks
construct validity, it will produce a gen-
eral case that is more-or-less unrelated to
the base case(s).
External validity is the extent to
which the causal analysis and explana-
tions offered by the theory may be ap-
plied to similar phenomena. External va-
lidity is primarily concerned with the
correspondence between the general
case and the goal case. Thus external va-
lidity is concerned with the “representa-
tiveness” of the general case in terms of
the goal case(s). External validity prima-
rily entails criterion validity, but it may
also imply reliability in objective re-
search since an observation must first be
reliable before external validity can be
shown.
Criterion validity is the extent to
which the data from the base case(s) will
predict some important form of behavior
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(criterion). This definition is also the
common meaning of the term validity,
and is also called “predictive validity”.
Criterion validity is highly achievable
when the observation will be used for ap-
titude or qualification (for example, a
drivers test is used for predicting driving
skills).
Internal validity is primarily a criteri-
on for stage one generalization, while ex-
ternal validity is primarily a criterion for
stage two generalization. Internal validi-
ty is confounded by the conceptual dis-
tance between the base case(s) and the
general case. That is, internal validity is
most easily established when there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the
base and general case. When multiple
base cases are introduced, the general
case must be abstracted on shared char-
acteristics raising complications with re-
gard to both construct and content valid-
ity. As a result, generalization classes
with idiographic stage one generaliza-
tion (PU and II generalization) should be
held to a high standard of internal valid-
ity. Generalization classes with universal
stage one generalization can typically
only meet lower standards of internal va-
lidity.
External validity is primarily a crite-
rion for stage two generalization. Exter-
nal validity is confounded by the concep-
tual distance between the general case
and the goal case. That is, external valid-
ity is most easily established when there
is a one-to-one correspondence between
the general and goal case. When multiple
goal cases are predefined, the general
case must be abstract enough to apply to
all goal cases in the population. This ab-
straction brings on problems with criteri-
on (predictive) validity. As a result, gen-
eralization classes with idiographic stage
two generalization (DI and II generaliza-
tion) should be held to a high standard of
external validity. Generalization classes
with universal stage two (NU and PU)
generalization can typically only meet
lower standards of internal validity.
5.3. Summary: Standards and 
Application of Generalization Criteria
Table 4 summarizes the varied criteria
standards for the four classes of general-
ization. “Hi Std” represents the a high
standard of this criterion (i.e. highly
achievable) for this class of method. “Lo
Std” represents a low standard of this cri-
terion (i.e. less achievable) for this class
of method. This figure captures the im-
plication that no single class of generali-
zation holds an ideal solution to this im-
portant process in social enquiry. This
analysis contradicts the commonly held
perception that NU generalizations (e.g.,
representative-sample statistical ques-
tionnaire surveys) provide ideally gener-
alizable research findings, and qualita-
tive forms of research (e.g., action re-
search or case studies) do not provide
generalizable findings at all. To the con-
trary, NU class generalizations have the
narrowest criteria standards of all four
classes. PU class generalizations, which
include in-depth case studies as well as
experiments, have the broadest criteria
standards for generalizations. To be fair,
no single class can lay claim to offering
the “only” or “best” generalization
mode, but each class has a different in-
tent for its generalizations, and appeals
to different criteria.
These standards are applicable dur-
ing the evaluation of various forms of so-
cial enquiry. For example, a one-shot
survey questionnaire research project,
which examines a random sample of IS
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organizations in Denmark regarding the
type of development method used in the
organization, might enable the research-
ers to make probabilistic statements
about development methods in all Dan-
ish IS organizations. The criteria for
judging the generalizable knowledge in
such a NU study should conform to the
upper left-hand quadrant of Table 4. The
most important criteria are non-quixotic
reliability and diachronic reliability.
These criteria are typically addressed by
pre-testing the instruments and statisti-
cally evaluating the sampling error (sta-
tistical significance). However, a longi-
tudinal study would improve the quality
considerably on both criteria. The nature
of the research is such that it would be in-
appropriate to heavily criticize such
studies on the basis of their synchronic
reliability (it is impractical to make mul-
tiple simultaneous measures of a large
number of subjects with any meaningful-
ness) or their validity (it is very difficult
to certify exactly how each of a large
number of diverse subjects interpreted
each survey item). These particular crite-
ria are not the basis from which the re-
searchers are accrediting the generaliza-
bility of their findings.
As another example, a laboratory ex-
periment in which student subjects are
tested for comprehension after reading
video screen information in particular
color combinations might be used to sug-
gest ideal default screen colors for all
software products. The criteria for judg-
ing the generalizability of such a PU
study should conform to the upper right-
hand quadrant of Table 4. Such studies
should meet high quality standards for
all forms of reliability and validity ex-
cept external validity. In other words, it
would be reasonable to expect careful
validation of measurement instruments
to eliminate quixotic reliability and es-
tablish both content and construct valid-
ity in the observations. Multiple simulta-







Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Lo Std
Diachronic Reliability: Hi Std
Internal Validity: Lo Std
External Validity: Lo Std
Provisional Universal (PU)
Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Hi Std
Diachronic Reliability: Hi Std
Internal Validity: Hi Std
External Validity: Lo Std
Idiographic
Deductive Idiographic (DI)
Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Hi Std
Diachronic Reliability: Lo Std
Internal Validity: Lo Std
External Validity: Hi Std
Inductive Idiographic (II)
Quixotic Reliability: Hi Std
Synchronic Reliability: Lo Std
Diachronic Reliability: Lo Std
Internal Validity: Hi Std
External Validity: Hi Std
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neous measures and repetitive experi-
mentation are also reasonable expecta-
tions. However, it is unreasonable to
attack this research on the basis of its ex-
ternal and criterion validity, for example,
by positing that students in laboratory
settings will behave differently than pro-
fessionals in office settings. This is un-
reasonable because this kind of criteria is
not the basis for the generalizability of
knowledge in this class of study.
A third example might be a multiple
case study in which managers and pro-
grammers in several software companies
are interviewed about the practical im-
portance of object-oriented system de-
velopment techniques. The study would
no doubt analyze general differences be-
tween the companies (size, organization,
corporate culture, products, etc.) along
with the analysis of differences and sim-
ilarities in interview contents. One
would expect to hold this kind of DI
study to the criteria pattern found in the
lower left-hand quadrant of Table 4. For
example, the interview contents should
be not be quixotic, there should be mul-
tiple chains of evidence (for example,
several confirmational programmer in-
terviews with each subject company) for
synchronic reliability, and the general
analysis should make external and crite-
rion validity clear (what kinds of compa-
nies are involved). Strongly criticizing
such studies on the basis of their dia-
chronic reliability (case studies cannot
be repeated because of the changing na-
ture of organizations and their actors), or
internal validity (the interpretive nature
of observations in multiple case studies
make this construct very difficult to
prove) amounts to an attack on these
kinds of studies in general, rather than
the particular study in question.
A fourth example might be an action
research study in which a collaborative
team studies administrative congestion
problems in a multi-organizational
bridge-construction project, ultimately
developing a document tracking system
as the solution. This kind of II study
should be held to the criteria pattern
found in the lower right-hand quadrant
of Table 4. This work may be judged
strongly on its validity, both internal and
external. For example, convincing evi-
dence should be presented that the team
was engaged in the stated problem, that
the theoretical elements were actually in
use, and that enough details are provided
about the subject organization such that
readers can confidently project the learn-
ing into another, quite dissimilar prob-
lem setting. Holding such studies up to
high standards of synchronic reliability
(the participative nature of action re-
search obstructs the verification of ob-
jective observations) or diachronic relia-
bility (neither the organization nor any
particular set of its contemporary prob-
lems can be repeated) would be quite ir-
relevant to the class of generalization
that underlies this study.
The correlation between these class-
es of generalization and specific meth-
ods of social enquiry is somewhat ideal-
ized. While we may discuss idealized
forms research methods (e.g., “the” case
study research method or “the” sampling
survey method), these often vary in prac-
tice. Data collection or analytical tech-
niques normally associated with one ide-
alized method may be correctly used
within another idealized method (e.g.,
using participant observation to collect
survey data, or using questionnaires to
collect case study data). In practice,
ground-breaking research can be a
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messy, unstructured process (Root-Bern-
stein 1989). Applying these generaliza-
tion criteria may require examining the
underlying claims for validity and relia-
bility in cases where the exact method of
enquiry is atypical.
6. Discussion
Qualitative social science has bristled
over the generalization issue for some
time. Our understanding of generaliza-
bility has not been helped by the narrow
view of social scientific enquiry adopted
by many textbooks. For example, Black
and Champion (1976) premised that “re-
search should suggest a general set of
phenomena to which the theory applies.
This enables falsifiability by proposing
cases which provide subsequent obser-
vations.” This viewpoint admits only the
Popperian view of social scientific en-
quiry and leads to an unsound dismissal
of the practical value of qualitative re-
search.
The opposing views in the qualitative
science “camp” have appeared in the lit-
erature, but these have not been as col-
lectively coherent as the critics. Yin, for
example, suggests that case studies are
generalizable, but like experiments are
generalizable: to theory, not to a popula-
tion:
This analogy to samples and universes is
incorrect when dealing with case studies.
… A common complaint about case
studies is that it is difficult to generalize
from one case to another. Thus analysts
fall into the trap of trying to select a ‘rep-
resentative’ case or set of cases. Yet no
set of cases, no matter how large, is
likely to deal satisfactorily with the com-
plaint. The problem lies in the very
notion of generalizing to other case stud-
ies. Instead, an analyst should try to gen-
eralize findings to ‘theory,’ analogous to
the way a scientist generalizes from
experimental results to theory. (Note that
the scientist does not attempt to select
‘representative’ experiments.) (Yin
1989, p.43-44)
Yin goes on to discuss an example of this
generalization to theory, citing Jacobs
(1961) as an illustration. Jacobs’ book
developed a theory of urban planning by
organizing cases into categories like the
role of sidewalks, the role of neighbor-
hood parks, etc.
Gummesson (1988) provided an
analysis that noted different standards of
criteria for qualitative versus quantita-
tive research. He found that reliability is
the favorite criterion of quantitative sci-
ence because it fulfills three roles: curb
erroneous research, make the logic ex-
plicit, and form a “validity crutch” (re-
place validity with reliability when the
former is beyond reach). He also noticed
that reliability is problematic in qualita-
tive studies because it is impossible to
replicate rich, multivariate social events
that form the subject of the observations.
Diachronic reliability is unreachable,
since events cannot be repeated. Syn-
chronic reliability, however, is possible
in two senses. First, multiple observers
can be used to triangulate on the meaning
in the observation. Second, the “observa-
tion” can be removed from the social
event. The observation can be made re-
garding the raw documentation taken
from the event (transcripts, audio tapes,
diaries). 
Gummesson also noticed that validi-
ty is the favorite criterion of qualitative
science because the limited number of
observations permit more detailed link-
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ages between the theory and a particular
phenomenon. The direct, interpretive ob-
servation techniques eliminate problems
of instrumental validity. Most qualitative
research infers the theory directly from
the observed data (ex post facto hypoth-
esizing) which means that construct and
content validity are almost automatically
present. Further, the language of the the-
ory is often freed from mathematics.
This can promote external validity by al-
lowing broader conceptual descriptions
or “useful ambiguity” that permit slight-
ly differing phenomena to be grouped
into one analytical class.
Gummesson noted that validity is
problematic for quantitative studies, par-
ticularly when the underlying subject of
study may be undergoing transforma-
tional processes. That is, the subject of
study may be a social process, and social
processes continually change in nature.
This means validation must be a contin-
uing process and diachronic reliability is
problematic. Since validity may have to
be reestablished with each observation,
the theoretical constructs may change
with each observation.
The problem with all of these views
has been the failure in considering the
complete generalization process. Gener-
alization has heretofore been deemed as
only the process of creating the general
case. As argued here, however, this is
only the first stage of the generalization
process. The complete process of gener-
alization must include the projection of
the general case into a goal case. When
this complete process is considered, a
more balanced view of social enquiry
takes shape. In this view, the practical
sense of generalization becomes univer-
sal across the full range of social scientif-
ic methodology. Importantly, by using
this view, we can describe the appropri-
ate criteria by which to judge the gener-
alizability of differing classes of social
enquiry.
Notes
1A strict dichotomy between idiographic and uni-
versal settings is conceptual to a large degree. Most
research can be interpreted as occupying some
position along a continuum from conceptually
ideal idiography to conceptually ideal universality.
2There are also naturalistic criteria for generaliza-
tions, such as credibility, transferability, dependa-
bility, and confirmability.
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Appendix
There are various fundamental dichoto-
mies in the philosophy of science that af-
fect how the scientist discovers causal
relationships, explanations, and as a con-
sequence, the general cases. However,
few of these dichotomies involve any ar-
gument on either side that denies causal-
ity, explanation or generalization. It is
fallacious to assume that generalization
is a concept that is peculiar to certain
narrow scientific viewpoints. This ap-
pendix explores and supports our as-
sumption that generalization is a relevant
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criterion in both aspects of many scien-
tific dichotomies. Basing the definitions
of these dichotomous positions on Flew
(1979) and Bullock and Stallybrass
(1977), we will consider some examples
below:
Objective and Subjective Generalization
Objective science regards a scientific
theory as one that takes shared experi-
ence to be the sole foundation of factual
knowledge. Subjective science is a con-
trasting position that regards a scientific
theory as one that takes private experi-
ence to be the sole foundation of factual
knowledge. Neither position actually de-
nies causal relationships or explanation
and general cases exist in both modes of
thinking.
Empirical and Rational Generalization
Empirical science assumes that all
knowledge is derived from experience;
and that a linguistic expression is signif-
icant only if associated by rule with
something that can be experienced. Ra-
tional science assumes that our knowl-
edge of the nature of what exists may be
obtained by reason alone; and that every-
thing is explicable in a single system of
knowledge. Neither position involves
any denial of causality, explanatory ex-
pressions or generalization.
Realist and Idealist Generalization
Realist science, in the sense that physical
objects exist independently of being per-
ceived, can be contrasted with idealist
science. Idealism assumes that the exter-
nal world is somehow created by the
mind. Certainly realist science entails
causality and generalization. In idealist
science, the discovery of co-related phe-
nomena (or appearances), and conse-
quently generalization are allowed under
Hegel’s objective Idealism (the monistic,
absolute mind), Kant’s transcendental
idealism, and especially under Berke-
ley’s monistic “mind-of-God” view.
Realist and Nominalist Generalization
Realist science also typically assumes
that universals have a real substantial ex-
istence independently of being thought.
This also contrasts with nominalist sci-
ence which assumes that universals are
merely names and have no existence in-
dependently of being thought. In this
case both positions actually seek to de-
fine the nature of generalization, and dif-
fer only in their opinion of its nature.
That is, realist science assumes the gen-
eral case is a set of cases with an inde-
pendent existence. Nominalist science
assumes the general case is merely an
idea that we have attached to some of our
impressions.
Reductionist and Holist Generalization
Reductionist science regards a doctrine
that claims to reduce the apparently more
sophisticated and complex to the less so.
Holist science holds that some wholes
are more than the sum of their parts. Re-
ductionist science seeks explanations
and generalization through a systematic
practice whereby concepts are redefined
or analyzed in terms of more elementary
or basic concepts. Holist science ex-
plains parts only in terms of their func-
tions in the whole, and wholes necessar-
ily have characteristics that cannot be ex-
plained by the properties and relations of
their constituents. This view defines its
generalizations in terms of this parts-
whole relationship.
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Inductive and Deductive Generalization
Inductive science involves a method of
reasoning by which a general law or
principle is inferred from observed par-
ticular instances. Deductive science as-
sumes that all valid arguments are those
in which it is impossible to assert the
premises and deny the conclusion with-
out contradicting oneself. Deductive sci-
ence establishes an hypothesis, which
can be expressed with deductive logic
and then tested against observations in
reality. Inductive science derives the hy-
pothesis from observations in reality.
Both settings seek relationships between
variable elements, implying causality
and the search for generalization.
Positivist and Interpretivist 
Generalization
Positivism and interpretivism are terms
that are often used very broadly. In one
sense, positivism implies that all true
knowledge is scientific C describing the
coexistence and succession of observa-
ble phenomena. In contrast, interpretiv-
ism assumes that all observable phenom-
ena are subjectively interpreted in a cog-
nitive process beyond the control of the
observer. Positivist generalizations
emerge from the observations, and phi-
losophy is limited to explaining the
scope and methods of making positive
observations. Interpretivist generaliza-
tions emerge from agreements about ob-
servations. These agreements represent
contemporary linguistic conventions
about the meaning of the observation. In-
terpretivist philosophy offers means for
obtaining generalizations that are not
available to science from direct observa-
tions. However, both positions adopt
generalizations
Positivist and Relativist Generalization
Positivist science also holds that knowl-
edge must be accepted as we find it, and
is not further explicable. This position
contrasts with relativist science, which
holds that beliefs and principles have no
universal or timeless validity; that is,
there is no such thing as objective knowl-
edge independent of the knower. Positiv-
ist science poses generalizations that are
held to a certain permanence. Relativist
generalizations are limited to the partic-
ular age, social group, or individual
holding such beliefs. However, both po-
sitions admit generalization.
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